Investigation of GNSS integrity augmentation synergies with unmanned aircraft sense-and-avoid systems by Sabatini, R et al.
Thank
??????
???????
??????
Citatio
See th
Version
Copyri
Link to
you for do
??????????
??????????
??????????
n: 
is record i
:
ght Statem
 Published
wnloading
??????????
?????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????
n the RMI
ent: © 
 Version:
 this docum
????????????
??????????
T Researc
ent from 
??????????
h Reposit
the RMIT R
??????????
ory at: 
esearch R
??????????
epository
??????????
???
??
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE THIS PAGE
Sabatini, R, Moore, T, Hill, C and Ramasamy, S 2015, 'Investigation of GNSS integrity
augmentation synergies with unmanned aircraft sense-and-avoid systems', in Proceedings
of the SAE 2015 AeroTech Congress and Exhibition, Warrendale, PA, United States, 22-24
September 2015, pp. 1-11
https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/view/rmit:33428
Accepted Manuscript
 2015 SAE International
 http://dx.doi.org/10.4271/2015-01-2456
Page 1 of 10 
 
2015-01-2456 
Investigation of GNSS Integrity Augmentation Synergies with Unmanned                        
Aircraft Systems Sense-and-Avoid 
Roberto Sabatini 
RMIT University – SAMME, Melbourne, Australia 
 Terry Moore and Chris Hill  
The University of Nottingham – Nottingham Geospatial Institute (NGI), Nottingham, UK 
Subramanian Ramasamy 
RMIT University – SAMME, Melbourne, Australia 
 
Abstract 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) can support the 
development of low-cost and high performance navigation and 
guidance architectures for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and, in 
conjunction with suitable data link technologies, the provision of 
Automated Dependent Surveillance (ADS) functionalities for 
cooperative Sense-and-Avoid (SAA). In non-cooperative SAA, the 
adoption of GNSS can also provide the key positioning and, in some 
cases, attitude data (using multiple antennas) required for automated 
collision avoidance. A key limitation of GNSS for both cooperative 
(ADS) and non-cooperative applications is represented by the 
achievable levels of integrity.  Therefore, an Avionics Based Integrity 
Augmentation (ABIA) solution is proposed to support the 
development of an Integrity-Augmented SAA (IAS) architecture 
suitable for both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. The 
performances of this IAS architecture were investigated in 
representative simulation case studies by testing the ability of the 
SAA system to exploit the predictive (caution) and reactive (warning) 
integrity flags generated by ABIA. Additionally, the ABIA False 
Alarm Rate (FAR) and Detection Probability (DP) performances 
were examined and an initial evaluation of the complementarity with 
Space-Based and Ground-Based Augmentation Systems 
(SBAS/GBAS) was accomplished. Simulation results show that the 
proposed IAS architecture is capable of performing high-integrity 
conflict detection and resolution when GNSS is used as the primary 
source of navigation data and there is a clear synergy with state-of-
the art SBAS/GBAS in all applicable flight phases.     
Introduction 
One of the key challenges encountered by the aviation community for 
integration of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) into non-segregated 
airspace is the provision of a certifiable Sense-And-Avoid (SAA) 
capability. In addition to Space Based Augmentation Systems 
(SBAS) and Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS), Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) augmentation can take the form 
of additional information being provided and processed by other on-
board avionic sensors and systems. In most cases, the additional 
avionics sensors/systems operate via separate principles than the 
GNSS and this property can be exploited by suitable data fusion 
algorithms to generate suitable warnings in case of GNSS data 
degradation or losses, thereby allowing a timely reaction/correction 
by the human pilot or by Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (UAV) 
Automatic Flight Control Systems (AFCS). A system such as this is 
called Avionics-Based or Aircraft-Based Augmentation System 
(ABAS). ABAS, GBAS and SBAS address (using different but 
synergic approaches) all four cornerstones of GNSS performance 
augmentation, namely: accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity 
[1-3]. The ABAS approach is particularly well suited to increase the 
levels of integrity and accuracy (as well as continuity in multi-sensor 
data fusion architectures) of GNSS in a variety of mission- and 
safety-critical applications. In UAS applications, airworthiness 
requirements for both cooperative and non-cooperative SAA impose 
stringent GNSS data integrity requirements, which cannot be fulfilled 
by current SBAS and GBAS technologies in some of the most 
demanding operational tasks. Therefore, a properly designed 
Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) system would allow 
an extended spectrum of autonomous and safety-critical operations 
including UAS SAA. The ABIA system performs a continuous 
monitoring of GNSS integrity levels in flight by analysing the 
relationships between aircraft manoeuvres and GNSS accuracy 
degradations or signal losses (Doppler shift, multipath, antenna 
obscuration, signal-to-noise ratio, jamming, etc.). In case of any 
detected or predicted integrity threshold violation, the ABIA system 
provides suitable warning or caution signals to the UAV AFCS and 
to the remote Ground Control Station (GCS), thereby allowing timely 
correction manoeuvres to be performed.  This increased level of 
integrity could provide a pathway to support unrestricted access of 
UAS to all classes of airspace. Furthermore, using suitable data link 
and data processing technologies on the ground, a certified ABAS 
capability could be a core element of a future GNSS Space-Ground-
Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN) for UAS SAA and other 
safety-critical aircraft/UA applications. 
ABIA System 
Previous research on ABIA systems demonstrated the potential of 
this technology to enhance GNSS integrity performance in a variety 
of mission- and safety-critical applications including experimental 
flight test/flight inspection, precision approach and automatic landing 
[1-5]. Therefore, an advanced ABIA system was developed for UAS 
applications (Figure 1).  In this system, the on-board sensors provide 
information on the aircraft relevant flight parameters (navigation 
data, engine settings, etc.) to an Integrity Flag Generator (IFG), 
which is also connected to the GNSS system.  Using the available 
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data on GNSS and the relevant aircraft flight parameters, integrity 
signals are generated, which are sent to the UAV GCS or used by a 
Flight Path Optimisation Module (FPOM). This system addresses 
both predictive and reactive nature of GNSS integrity augmentation 
by producing suitable integrity flags (cautions and warnings) in case 
of predicted/ascertained GNSS data losses or unacceptable signal 
degradations exceeding the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) 
specified for each phase of flight, and providing guidance 
information to the remote pilot/autopilot to avoid further data 
losses/degradations.    
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Figure 1.  ABIA system architecture for UAS applications. 
The IFG module produces the following integrity flags [1-3]: 
 Caution Integrity Flag (CIF): a predictive annunciation that the 
GNSS data delivered to the avionics system is going to exceed 
the RNP thresholds specified for the current and planned flight 
operational tasks (GNSS alert status).  
 Warning Integrity Flag (WIF): a reactive annunciation that the 
GNSS data delivered to the avionics system has exceeded the 
RNP thresholds specified for the current flight operational task 
(GNSS fault status).  
The following definitions of Time-to-Alert (TTA) are applicable to 
the ABIA system [1-3]: 
 ABIA Time-to-Caution (TTC): the minimum time allowed for the 
caution flag to be provided to the user before the onset of a GNSS 
fault resulting in an unsafe condition.  
 ABIA Time-to-Warning (TTW): the maximum time allowed from 
the moment a GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition is 
detected to the moment that the ABIA system provides a warning 
flag to the user. 
 
 
ABIA Integrity Flag Generator 
The main causes of GNSS data degradation or signal losses in 
aviation applications were deeply analysed in [1] and are listed 
below:  
 Antenna obscuration (i.e., obstructions from the wings, fuselage 
or empennage during maneuvers). 
 Adverse satellite geometry, resulting in high Position Dilution of 
Precision (PDOP). 
 Fading, resulting in reduced carrier to noise ratios (C/N0). 
 Doppler shift, impacting signal tracking and 
acquisition/reacquisition time. 
 Multipath effects, leading to a reduced C/N0 and to range/phase 
errors. 
 Interference and jamming. 
Understanding the physics of these phenomena and developing 
reliable mathematical models was essential in order to properly 
design the ABIA IFG module [1, 6]. Figure 2 illustrates the 
architecture of the IFG module and its interfaces. The ABIA IFG 
module is designed to provide CIF and WIF alerts in real-time (i.e., 
in accordance with the specified TTC and TTW requirements in all 
relevant flight phases).  IFG module inputs are from the GNSS 
receiver and other aircraft sensors. The GNSS and Sensors Layer 
(GSL) passes the aircraft Position, Velocity, Time (PVT) and attitude 
(Euler angles) data (from the on board Inertial Navigation Systems, 
Air Data Computer, etc.), GNSS data (raw measurements and PVT) 
and the Flight Control System (FCS) actuators data to the Data 
Extraction Layer (DEL). At this stage, the required Navigation and 
Flight Dynamics (NFD) and GNSS Constellation Data (GCD) are 
extracted, together with the relevant information from an aircraft 
Three-Dimensional Model (3DM) and from a Terrain and Objects 
Database (TOD). The 3DM database is a detailed geometric model of 
the aircraft built in a Computer Aided Three-dimensional Interactive 
Application (CATIA). The TOD uses a Digital Terrain Elevation 
Database (DTED) and additional man-made objects data to obtain a 
detailed map of the surfaces neighbouring the aircraft.  In the 
Integrity Processing Layer (IPL), the Doppler Analysis Module 
(DAM) calculates the Doppler shift by processing the NFD and GCD 
inputs.  
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Figure 2.  ABIA IFG module architecture. 
The Multipath Analysis Module (MAM) processes the 3DM, TOD, 
GNSS Constellation Module (GCM) and Aircraft 
Navigation/Dynamics Module (ADM) inputs to determine multipath 
contributions from the aircraft (wings/fuselage) and from the 
terrain/objects close to the aircraft. The Obscuration Analysis Module 
(OAM) receives inputs from ADM, GCS and Aircraft Dynamics 
SIMulator (ADSIM), and computes the GNSS antenna obscuration 
matrices corresponding to the various aircraft manoeuvres. The 
Signal Analysis Module (SAM) calculates the link budget of the 
direct GNSS signals received by the aircraft in the presence of 
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atmospheric propagation disturbances (C/N0), as well as the 
applicable radio frequency interference and Jamming-to-Signal ratio 
(J/S) levels. The Integrity Flags Layer (IFL) uses a set of predefined 
CIF/WIF threshold parameters to trigger the generation of both 
caution and warning flags associated with antenna obscuration, 
Doppler shift, multipath, carrier, interference and satellite geometry 
degradations. The approach adopted to set-up thresholds for the 
ABIA CIF and WIF integrity flags is depicted in Figure 3.  In order 
to generate CIFs and WIFs that are consistent with current GNSS 
RNP, the Horizontal and Vertical Accuracy (HA/VA) requirements 
are introduced in the various flight phases.  The 1-σ Estimated 
Position Error (EPE), Estimated Horizontal Error (EHE) and 
Estimated Vertical Errors (EVE) of a GNSS receiver are calculated 
using the Position Dilution of Precision (PDOP), Horizontal Dilution 
of Precision (HDOP) or Vertical Dilution of Precision (VDOP) 
respectively. The Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) is defined as the 
radius of a circle in the horizontal plane, with its centre being at the 
true position, which describes the region required to contain the 
indicated horizontal position with a specified probability for a 
particular navigation mode.  Similarly, the Vertical Alert Limit 
(VAL) is defined as half the length of a segment on the vertical axis, 
with its centre being at the true position, which describes the region 
required to contain the indicated vertical position with a specified 
probability for a particular navigation mode.  Multipath integrity 
flags were defined using the Early-Late Phase (ELP) observable and 
the range error [7].  A dedicated analysis of the GNSS receiver 
tracking performance was performed to define the integrity 
thresholds associated with Doppler and fading effects. When the 
GNSS measurement errors exceed certain thresholds, the receiver 
loses lock to the satellites. Since both the code and carrier tracking 
loops are nonlinear, especially near the threshold regions, only Monte 
Carlo simulations of the GNSS receiver in different dynamics and 
SNR conditions can determine the receiver tracking performance. 
Numerous sources of measurement errors affect the Phase Lock Loop 
(PLL), Frequency Lock Loop (FLL) and Delay Lock Loop (DLL).  
PLL, FLL and DLL are used in Scalar Tracking Loops (STL) and 
Vector Tracking Loops (VTL) are also considered as part of this 
research. The models described in              [8, 9] allow determining 
receiver tracking thresholds in terms of Carrier-to-Noise      ) 
ratios.  
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Figure 3.  Integrity flag thresholds. 
The threshold criterion applicable to the ABIA system is:   
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where           is the minimum      for PLL tracking,                        
         is the minimum      for FLL tracking,           is the 
minimum      for DLL tracking,              is the minimum 
     for combined PLL and FLL tracking and           is the 
minimum      for VTL based tracking. Numerical solution of the 
tracking equation shows that the weak link in unaided avionics GNSS 
receivers is the carrier tracking loop threshold due to greater 
sensitivity to dynamics stress [8, 9].  Therefore, the           
threshold can be adopted in these cases. Using these theoretical and 
experimental threshold values, we can also calculate the receiver 
Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) performance for the various cases of practical 
interest, as described in [9].  When available, flight test data collected 
in representative portions of the aircraft operational flight envelope (or 
the results of Monte Carlo simulation) can be used. In avionics 
receivers, lock detectors are used to assess if the satellite signals are 
being tracked or not tracked. Code lock detection is very similar to 
estimating the received     , inferring that the receiver is operating 
on or near the correlation peak. The spread spectrum processing gain 
(  ) is defined as the ratio of the spread bandwidth to the unspread 
(baseband) bandwidth and is expressed in dB. The post-correlation 
Signal-to-Noise       ratio is calculated from [10]: 
                                                   (2) 
The relationship between      and jammer signal power (J) is given 
by [10]: 
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where    is the thermal noise power spectral density,    is the P-code 
chipping rate (chips/s), S is the signal power received at the GNSS 
antenna input, C is the carrier power and J/S is the jamming-to-signal 
ratio. The J/S performance of a GNSS receiver at its tracking threshold 
can be evaluated by the following equation [11]: 
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where   is the processing gain adjustment factor and is equal to 1 for 
Narrowband Jammers (NBJ), 1.5 for Spread Spectrum Jammers (SSJ) 
and 2 for Wideband Gaussian Jammers (WGJ), and           is the 
receiver tracking threshold (dB-Hz). When the receiver code is aligned 
with the transmitted code, the signal power at the band pass output is 
crushed into approximately 100 Hz of bandwidth.  The processing 
gain of the GNSS receiver is given as: 
            ( 
   
  
)                                    (5) 
where CR is the chipping rate and    is the data period.  For the C/A-
code this works out to be about 43 dB. Typical avionics receivers 
have a cut off value at 10 dB, which means that if the value is less 
than this, the satellite signal level is too low to be used in the 
positioning computations. Therefore, an additional threshold criterion 
to be accounted for in the ABIA system is given as: 
                                                  (6) 
During experimental flight test activities performed with unaided  L1 
C/A code avionics receivers, it was also found that, in a variety of 
dynamics conditions, a      of 25 dB-Hz was sufficient to keep 
tracking of the satellites [11].  Consequently, taking a 2 dB margin for 
the CIF, the following additional criteria are adopted for S/N integrity 
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flags. The criteria for caution and warning integrity flag generation are 
listed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
Table. 1. CIF criteria. 
 
Type of CIF Criteria 
Masking 
When the current aircraft manoeuvre will lead 
to less the 4 satellite in view, the CIF shall be 
generated. 
Satellite  
visibility 
When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle 
(antenna frame) is less than 10 degrees, the CIF 
shall be generated. 
DOP  
When the EHE exceeds the HA 95% or the VA 
95% alert requirements, the CIF shall be 
generated. 
Multipath 
When the Early-Late-Phase (ELP) exceeds 0.1 
radians, the CIF shall be generated. 
Tracking loops 
When either 
               
                   
                        the CIF shall be 
generated. 
Receiver 
processing gain 
When    is more than 11 dB (margin of 1 dB), 
the CIF shall be generated. 
Satellite 
tracking 
When the      is less than 27dB-Hz or the 
difference between the S/N and the processing 
gain is less than 12 dB, the CIF shall be 
generated.  
When the signal tracking errors are within 5% 
of the maximum error budget tolerated by the 
receiver, the CIF shall be generated. 
SBAS/GBAS Integrity Flag Generation 
During the landing phase, a GNSS Landing System (GLS) has to be 
augmented by GBAS in order to achieve the RNP, as well as 
Horizontal and Vertical Protection Level (HPL and VPL) 
requirements.  In the case of Local Area Augmentation System 
(LAAS), the system allows the adoption of multiple Differential 
Global Positioning System (DGPS) reference receivers. In order to 
perform a comparative evaluation of the ABIA IFG module with 
GBAS and SBAS, the GBAS/SBAS Integrity Flag Generation 
Processes (IFGPs) are considered as illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 
respectively. Vertical and Lateral Protection Level (VPL and LPL) 
for SBAS and GBAS are calculated in line with the Minimum 
Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for WAAS and LAAS 
[12, 13].   
 
Table. 2. WIF criteria. 
 
Type of WIF Criteria 
Masking 
When less than 4 satellites are in view, the WIF 
shall be generated. 
Satellite  
visibility 
When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle 
is less than 5 degrees, the WIF shall be 
generated. 
DOP 
When the EHE exceeds the HAL or the EVE 
exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be generated. 
Multipath 
When the multipath range error exceeds 1 
meter, the WIF shall be generated. 
When the multipath ranging error exceeds 2 
metres and the aircraft flies in proximity of the 
ground (below 500 ft AGL), the WIF shall be 
generated. 
Tracking loops 
When either         
 or            or 
         the WIF shall be generated. 
Receiver 
processing gain 
When    is less than 9 dB (margin of 1 dB), the 
WIF shall be generated. 
Satellite 
tracking 
When the signal tracking loss conditions occur, 
the WIF shall be generated. 
When the      is less than 25dB-Hz or the 
difference between the S/N and the processing 
gain is less than 10 dB, the WIF shall be 
generated. 
 
Additionally, [13] provides the so-called Continuity of Protection 
Levels in terms of Predicted Lateral and Vertical Protection Levels 
(PLPL and PVPL).  According to the LAAS MOPS, avionics-based 
functionalities such as ABAS/ABIA would support PLPL/PVPL 
calculations to generate appropriate caution flags.  In our research, we 
propose that a similar functionality be implemented in SBAS and 
supported by the ABIA system measurements. As both GBAS and 
SBAS use redundant GNSS satellite observations to generate integrity 
flags (i.e., 5 satellites for LAAS and 6 satellites for WAAS), the 
number of satellites in view can be used to set additional thresholds. In 
order to perform a comparative evaluation of the ABIA IFG module 
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with GBAS and SBAS, the GBAS/SBAS Integrity Flag Generation 
Processes (IFGPs) are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 respectively. 
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Figure 4.  GBAS IFG. 
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Figure 5. SBAS IFG. 
The SBAS/GBAS CIF and WIF criteria are tabulated in Tables 3 and 
4 respectively.  
 
Table. 3. SBAS/GBAS CIF criteria. 
 
Type of CIF Criteria 
Continuity of 
protection 
levels 
When PVPLGBAS exceeds VAL or PLPLGBAS 
exceeds LAL, the CIF shall be generated. 
When PVPLSBAS exceeds VAL or PLPLSBAS 
exceeds LAL, the CIF shall be generated. 
Satellite  
visibility 
When number of satellites in view is less than 5, 
the GBAS CIF shall be generated. 
When number of satellites in view is less than 7, 
the SBAS CIF shall be generated. 
 
 
Table. 4.SGBAS/GBAS WIF criteria. 
 
Type of WIF Criteria 
Continuity of 
protection 
levels 
When VPLGBAS exceeds VAL or HPLGBAS 
exceeds HAL, the WIF shall be generated. 
When VPLSBAS exceeds VAL or HPLSBAS exceeds 
HAL, the WIF shall be generated. 
Satellite  
visibility 
When number of satellites in view is less than 4, 
the GBAS WIF shall be generated. 
When number of satellites in view is less than 6, 
the SBAS WIF shall be generated. 
 
Sense-and-avoid System 
Cooperative and non-cooperative SAA are implemented to address 
UAS safe integration into the non-segregated airspace. The SAA 
capability can be defined as the automatic detection of possible 
conflicts (i.e., collision threats) by the UAV platform and the 
implementation of avoidance manoeuvres to prevent the identified 
collision threats. As part of our research, the possible synergies 
attainable with the adoption of different detection, tracking and 
trajectory generation algorithms were studied.  Additionally, the error 
propagation from different sources and the impacts of host and 
intruders dynamics on the ultimate SAA solution were investigated. 
The system detection range and FOR have to be adequate to ensure 
separation from the intruder to prevent a probable near mid-air 
collision. This criterion is also naturally applicable in the case of small 
UAV since the vast majority of mid-air collision events occur below 
3000 ft [14]. A number of cooperative and non-cooperative 
sensors/systems have been studied recently. Cooperative systems 
typically include Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) / 
Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) and Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). Optical, thermal, 
LIDAR, Millimeter Wave (MMW) radar and acoustic sensors are 
adopted as part of non-cooperative sensors.  
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Uncertainty Volume 
Error analysis is performed to determine the overall uncertainty 
volume in the airspace surrounding the intruder tracks. This is 
accomplished by considering both the navigation and the tracking 
errors affecting the measurements and translating them to unified 
range and bearing uncertainty descriptors. The shape of the combined 
navigation and tracking uncertainty volume is conveniently described 
using spherical harmonics. Using a spherical coordinates frame with 
origin at the host UA centre of mass, the range and bearing errors 
associated with the intruder tracking process is transformed into a 
local coordinate frame (either host or intruder body frame). Both 
navigation and tracking error ellipsoids are generated and the overall 
uncertainty volume is obtained by combining the two error ellipsoids 
[15, 16].  When the errors are not correlated, vector analysis is 
performed and when the errors are correlated, tensors analysis is 
adopted to obtain covariant and contravariant components. 
ABIA/SAA Systems Integration  
The Position, Velocity and Attitude (PVA) measurements are typically 
obtained by adopting multi-sensor data fusion techniques [17-19]. An 
initial flight path is generated using the ADM. The IFG module run is 
performed on that nominal trajectory. Based on a Boolean decision 
logic that sorts sensors data based on estimated performance 
parameters, the C-SAA or non-cooperative SAA sensors are used for 
safe separation. If both the safe separation thresholds are violated and 
a mid-air collision threat is detected the WIF is generated. To prevent 
any WIF, the flight path optimization process starts when the first CIF 
is generated. Pseudo-Spectral Optimisation (PSO) and Differential 
Geometry Optimization (DGO) techniques are used to generate a new 
optimised trajectory free of any integrity degradations. Depending on 
the relationship between the available time-to-collision and the 
computation time according to PSO and DGO trajectory solutions, the 
optimised trajectory data are sent to the AFCS (and/or to the ground 
pilot) for execution of the avoidance manoeuvres. In the trajectory 
optimisation process, time is used as the cost functional and the 
aircraft dynamics model/satellite elevations are used as path 
constraints. The ABIA/SAA integrated architecture is illustrated in 
Figure 6. The implemented decision logic is based on minimisation of 
the following cost function [20]: 
             ∫                      
     ∫                                   (7) 
where      is the estimated distance of the generated avoidance 
trajectory points from the avoidance volume associated with the 
obstacle,                is the estimated minimum distance of 
the avoidance trajectory from the avoidance volume,        |     
is the time at which the safe avoidance condition is successfully 
attained,      
  
 
    is the specific fuel consumption,      is the 
thrust profile.               are the weightings attributed to time, 
fuel, distance and integral distance respectively. In time-critical 
avoidance applications (i.e., closing-up obstacles with high relative 
velocities) appropriate higher weightings are used for the time and 
distance cost elements. 
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Figure 6. ABIA/SAA integrated architecture. 
Simulation Results 
A number of simulation case studies were performed to evaluate the 
performance of the ABIA/SAA integrated architecture. A GNSS 
constellation simulator was implemented to support GNSS satellite 
visibility, signal and geometry analysis.  Using CATIA-P3, a detailed 
ADM was developed and an ADSIM was implemented to generate the 
nominal flight path trajectory and Euler angles.  TOD was used to run 
the MPS and using a DTED, it a detailed map of the terrain beneath 
the aircraft was obtained.  Providing the aircraft trajectory inputs from 
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the ADSIM module, terrain elevation data were automatically 
extracted and fed to the TOM module where they are integrated with 
the database of man-made objects (e.g., buildings).   
 
Aircraft 3-D Model 
Various geometric parameters were extracted from the literature to 
draw a detailed CATIA model of the AEROSONDE UAV as 
illustrated in Figure 7 [17]. To calculate the Antenna Masking Matrix 
(AMM) and the corresponding satellite visibility conditions, the 
antenna location were included in the model. After creating the 3-D 
aircraft surface model, the corresponding CAD file was transformed 
in a Stereolithography (STL) file format. An STL file is a convenient 
representation of a complex 3D surface geometry, made by a number 
of oriented triangles (mesh). Each of these triangles is described by 
two elements: the first is a unit normal vector to the facet; the second 
element is a set of three points listed in counter clockwise order 
representing the vertices of the triangle. This representation is ideally 
suited for the ABIA simulation environment as shown in Figure 8. 
Using this representation, the AMMs in pitch and roll are generated 
calculating all possible intersections of the aircraft body (all 
triangular surfaces) with the LOS antenna-satellites. In order to 
generate CIF/WIF associated to critical UAV antenna masking 
conditions, a dedicated analysis is required taking into account the 
simultaneous variation of pitch and bank. In general, a satellite is 
geometrically visible to the GNSS receiver only if its elevation in the 
antenna frame is above the Earth horizon and the antenna elevation 
mask. It should be noted that even high performance avionics GNSS 
antennas have a gain patterns that is typically below -3dB at about 5 
degrees elevation and, as a consequence, their performance become 
marginal below this limit.  In order to determine if a satellite is 
obscured, the LOS of the satellite with respect to the antenna phase 
centre has to be determined.   
 
Figure 7.  AEROSONDE 3-D CATIA model. 
 
Figure 8.  AEROSONDE STL file imported in MATLAB. 
 
The location of the AEROSONDE GPS antenna extracted from the 
literature is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  AEROSONDE antennae locations. Adapted from [17]. 
IFG Simulation 
In order to validate the design of the ABIA IFG module, a MATLAB® 
simulation activity was performed employing the algorithms 
developed during this research. The simulated AEROSONDE UAV 
trajectory included the following flight phases: 
 Climb phase (0-300s); 
 Turning climb phase (300-600s); 
 Straight and level (cruise) phase (600-900s); 
 Level turn phase (900-1200s)  
 Turn and descend phase (1200-1500s); 
 Descend (straight approach) phase (1500-1800s); 
The combined GPS/GALILEO constellation was simulated and the 
GNSS receiver tracking loops were modelled with a flat random 
vibration power curve from 20Hz to 2000Hz with amplitude of 
0.005      and the oscillator vibration sensitivity           
     parts/g.  All CIFs and WIFs relative to antenna masking, 
geometric accuracy degradations, SNR, multipath and Doppler shift 
were generated.  The main results obtained with the simulated GPS 
constellation are shown in Table 5.  In some cases, the CIF was 
generated but it was not followed by the WIF (this was due to a 
temporary adverse relative geometry not leading to GNSS signal 
losses).  During the level turn and turning descent phases, the CIF was 
followed by the WIF.   
 
It was also observed that the CIF was always triggered at least 2 
seconds before the successive WIF onset (up to 13 seconds in one case 
during the turning descent phase). These results are consistent with 
previous ABIA research on manned aircraft applications [1-3] and 
corroborate the validity of the models developed for the CIF/WIF 
thresholds. It was also observed that the CIF was always triggered at 
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least 2 seconds before the successive WIF onset. This evidence is 
particularly important for the ABIA system design.   
 
Table. 5. IFG simulation results. 
 
Flight 
Phase 
CIF WIF 
Climb --- --- 
Turning 
Climb 
334~374s, 
426~446s 
517~558s 
--- 
Cruise 874~900s --- 
Level 
Turn 
901~1200s 
903~906s, 913s, 920~924s, 930~931s, 
938~942 s, 948~949s, 956~959s, 
966~967s, 974~977s, 984~985s, 
992~995s, 1002~1003s, 1110~1113s, 
1020~1021s, 1028~1031s, 1128~1129s, 
1136~1139s, 1146~1147s, 1154~1157s, 
1164~1165s, 1172~1175s, 1182~1183s, 
1190~1192s, 1200s 
Turning 
Descent 
1201~1441s, 
1448~1464s, 
1471~1487s 
1494~1500s 
1204s, 1223~1224s, 1247~1249s, 
1272~1273s, 1296~1297s, 1320~1321s, 
1344~1367s, 1368s, 1391~1392s, 
1414~1415s, 1438~1439s, 1461~1462s, 
1484~1485s 
Descent 1503~1800s 1504~1508s 
 
In fact, it is evident that the availability of a usable CIF represents a 
significant progress in this research with the potential for both manned 
aircraft and UAVs to recover from mission- and safety-critical flight 
conditions potentially leading to GNSS data losses. Therefore, it is 
envisaged that a properly designed ABIA FPM could take full 
advantage of this predictive behaviour, allowing the UAV to correct 
its flight trajectory/attitude in order to avoid the occurrence of the 
critical GNSS data losses.  Additionally, it is possible that this 
predictive behaviour be exploited in the pursuit of a GNSS based auto-
landing capability.  Assuming that all WIFs are true GNSS outages, 
we have a number of True Caution Flags (TCF), corresponding to the 
CIFs followed by WIFs.  There are also some CIFs not followed by 
WIFs that we identify as False Caution Flags (FCF).  Therefore, the 
Caution Detection Rate (CDR) can be calculated as: 
    
   
       
                                        (8) 
and the False Caution Rate (FCR) is: 
 
                                                (9) 
Since SBAS and GBAS are integrated in the IFG, the analysis is 
performed by flight phase and then a cumulative measure is also 
obtained.  With these assumptions, considering all flight phases, the 
total CDR is 60% and the FCR is 40%.  However, if we consider only 
the final flight phases (were GBAS/ABIA synergies are maximised), 
the CDP is actually 100% and the ABIA CIFs bring an improvement 
of 12% with respect to a purely reactive integrity approach (e.g., 
RAIM). 
 
ABIA/SAA Simulation 
The ABIA integration into an existing UAV SAA architecture was 
studied in cooperative and non-cooperative SAA scenarios. The test 
platforms used were 3DoF ADM: 
 
 AEROSONDE UAV (ABIA host platform)  and 
 AIRBUS 320 (A320) and AEROSONDE UAV intruders. 
 
In all the scenarios, an avoidance volume (sum of navigation and 
tracking errors) was generated by the SAA system [15]. PSO or 
constrained DGO techniques were used to generate the new trajectory 
based on the available time to conflict (host entering the avoidance 
volume). The avoidance trajectory was initiated by the SAA system 
when the probability of collision exceeded the required threshold 
value. Time and fuel were used in the cost functional, the dynamic 
model as dynamic constraint, and the elevation criteria as path 
constraints for both PSO and DGO techniques. Boundary conditions 
were set from the value of the flight parameters at CIF time step. A 
collision avoidance trajectory free of GNSS integrity degradation was 
generated. Figure 8 illustrates the cooperative SAA test scenario 
wherein two AEROSONDE UAV (1 ABIA host platform and 1 
intruder) are 90 off track at the same Flight Level (FL). The collision 
is detected and resolved and as a result the host and intruder UAVs 
avoid colliding in mid-air. The host UAV platform equipped with 
ABIA/SAA is able to generate an avoidance trajectory without any 
CIF/WIF occurrences. Three different points are shown on the 
ABIA/SAA host platform trajectory in Figure 10: 
 SAA Break-off Point: Corresponding to the point where the host 
UA initiates the avoidance trajectory (commanded by the SAA 
system). The cost function criteria adopted in this case is 
minimum time. 
 SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point:  Corresponding to the point where 
the host UAV can manoeuvre safely (any manoeuvre within its 
operational flight envelope) has 0 ROC.  From this point onwards 
the SAA cost function criteria switches to minimum time and 
minimum fuel to get back on the original (desired) track. 
 ABIA Re-join Point:  Corresponding to the point where the host 
UAV re-joins the original (desired) track without GNSS data 
degradations. 
 
SAA Break-off Point
SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point
GNSS Data Loss – SAA Commanded 
Trajectory (without ABIA)
ABIA Re-join Point
Host Platform ABIA/SAA
Intruder Platform
 
Figure 10. Illustration of reference points. 
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Figure 11 illustrates the non-cooperative SAA test scenario wherein 
AEROSONDE (ABIA host platform) UAV and an A320 are on the 
same FL but are 90 off track to each other. The horizontal and 
vertical separation obtained is illustrated in Figure 12. 
Host Platform ABIA/SAA
Intruder Platform
 
Figure 11. UAV 90º collision non-cooperative SAA scenario. 
 
 
Figure 12. Obtained horizontal and vertical separation. 
 
Figure 13 illustrates the cooperative SAA test scenario wherein 
AEROSONDE (ABIA host platform) UAV and two intruders 
(AEROSONDE UAVs) are on the same FL. One intruder UAV is 90 
off track and the other is on a head-on collision with the host UAV.  
 
SAA Break-off Point
SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point
ABIA Re-join Point
Host Platform ABIA/DAA
Intruder Platform
 
Figure 13. 3 UAV collision cooperative SAA scenario. 
The simulation results demonstrate that the ABIA IFG module is 
capable of generating integrity flags to provide both caution and 
warning signals when GNSS signals are degraded or lost. After the 
integrity caution flag is generated, the time available for the 
pilot/autopilot to react (before the integrity event is detected and the 
warning flag is generated), is at least 2 seconds. This TTC can support 
safety-critical tasks including GLS curved/segmented precision 
approach and automatic landing applications. Data analysis showed 
that the ABIA system can provide useful integrity signals for CAT-III 
precision approach and automatic landing (automated and real-time 
FPO is essential in this case). In the C-SAA and N-SAA scenarios 
investigated and in the dynamic conditions explored, all near mid-air 
collision threats were successfully avoided by implementing adequate 
trajectory optimisation algorithms. Both PSO and DGO algorithms 
proved successful in C-SAA and N-SAA scenarios depending on the 
available time for the optimisation loops (distance host-intruders and 
relative dynamics). Based on the position uncertainty of the host 
aircraft an optimised avoidance trajectory without any GNSS data 
losses is constructed around the resulting avoidance volume. In case of 
jamming, the overall avoidance volume is obtained by combining the 
tracking error of the jamming signal radiation pattern (main lobe in the 
case of a directional jammer) and the navigation error of the host 
platform. The optimised avoidance trajectory is constructed tangential 
to the radiation pattern of the jammer by taking into account the 
position uncertainty of the host platform. For the directional jamming 
scenario shown in Figure 14, a preferential right turn was imposed to 
avoid the UAV entering the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) of 
red (i.e., enemy) forces.  In this case, the optimal jamming avoidance 
trajectory was generated with weights set to wt=100%, wf=0%, 
wd=0%, wid=0% (i.e., fuel and distance objectives set to zero in the 
cost function) and using the ABIA criteria to avoid degradation or 
losses of GNSS data during the jammer avoidance manoeuvre. In this 
simulation, the constraints imposed by ABIA in terms of UAV 
platform dynamics and GNSS satellite elevation angles were 
considered to generate the optimised avoidance trajectories, thus 
preventing degradation or losses of navigation data during the whole 
jammer avoidance manoeuvre. 
 
Figure 14. Trajectory in the presence of directional jammer. 
These results confirm that ABIA contributes to providing an Integrity-
Augmented SAA (IAS) solution that is well suited for an extension of 
the current GBAS/SBAS augmentation network in a variety of 
mission- and safety-critical applications including UAS SAA. The 
inclusion of ABIA thus provides solid foundations for the 
development of a future SGAAN architecture meeting the 
requirements for manned and unmanned aircraft separation 
maintenance and collision avoidance tasks for all flight phases. 
Directional 
Jammer
RED FLOT
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Conclusions and Future Work 
The synergies between a GNSS Avionics Based Integrity 
Augmentation (ABIA) ABIA system and a novel UAS SAA 
architecture for cooperative and non-cooperative applications were 
explored. The proposed ABIA system is compatible and interoperable 
with current Space-Based and Ground-Based Augmentation Systems 
(SBAS/GBAS), allowing the implementation of an integrated 
Aircraft-Space-Ground Augmentation (ASGA) network. The 
integration of ABIA with cooperative and non-cooperative SAA 
architectures leads to an Integrity Augmented SAA (IAS) solution that 
is currently evolving to meet the performance requirements for a safe 
and unrestricted access of UAS to commercial airspace. Simulation 
case studies were performed on the ABIA/SAA modules in various 
representative scenarios, also including the presence of directional 
jammers. According to the simulation results, after the integrity 
caution flag is generated, the time available for the pilot/autopilot to 
react (before the integrity warning flag is generated), is sufficient for a 
variety of mission- and safety-critical tasks. The virtual integration of 
ABIA into an existing SAA architecture for cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios showed that all mid-air collision threats were 
successfully avoided by implementing suitable trajectory optimisation 
algorithms. Further research is currently focusing on the following 
main areas [21-23]:   
 Extend the ABAS/ABIA concept to other navigation, 
communication, surveillance and tracking applications also 
addressing SAA requirements. 
 Investigate ABIA applications and possible evolutions for Next 
Generation Flight Management System (NG-FMS) for manned 
and unmanned aircraft. 
 Evaluate the potential of ABAS/ABIA to enhance the 
performance of next generation Communication, Navigation and 
Surveillance / Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) systems for 
Performance/Intent Based Operations (PBO/IBO) and Four-
Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) management. 
 Study possible applications of the ABIA/SAA concepts to 
advanced mission planning and forensic applications.   
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